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The so-called purchasing power argument of wages (PPA), suggesting that rising wages 
could increase employment instead of reducing it, is examined within a general theoretical 
framework. While the demand side is modelled by means of a path-dependent Keynesian 
model with a Kaldorian saving function, a neoclassical production function is assumed on the 
supply side. It is shown that there is a core of truth in the PPA, if real wages are lower than  
marginal productivity of labour. While a temporary demand shock could indeed be overcome 
by rising wages, it is  not possible, however, to outweigh a permanent slump in total demand 
by  that way.  Moreover, in contrast to conventional fiscal policy, wage rises according to the 
PPA imply both a rising price level and the danger of neoclassical unemployment.  In an open 
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1. Introduction 
 
The so-called purchasing power argument of wages (PPA) suggests that a rise in wages could 
increase employment through raising total demand. While this argument is frequently used by 
unions and left-wing politicians, it is regularly either ignored or summarily dismissed by 
economists. Ludwig von Mises (1958, ), for instance, called it the purchasing power fable, 
and Gustav Cassel (1935, p. 66) spoke of “charlatan teachings”. Only recently, Hans-Werner 
Sinn (2007) rejected the PPA as “incorrect even for logical reasons: A wage increase is 
identical to a profit decrease, and to the same extent to which wage increases boost the 
purchasing power of the employees, they lower those of the employers. The existing 
purchasing power is simply distributed in a different way.”  
 
Surprisingly, however, attempts to subject the PPA to a rigorous theoretical analysis are rare. 
This is particularly surprising, as the argument has a long tradition, tracing back to the works 
of Marschak (1927), Lerner (1951) and Kalecki (1971). Nowadays, proponents of the PPA 
frequently refer to Keynes (1936), although no such proposition can be found in The General 
Theory.
1 The post-war Keynesian literature on the subject provided either mere descriptive 
arguments or incomplete analytical frameworks, e.g. ignoring the supply side and price 
reactions (e.g. Malinvaud 1977).   
 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 19 Keynes (1936, p. 262) actually warns that “the transfer from wage earners to other factors…is 
likely to diminish the marginal propensity to consume”. “Nowhere, however, does Keynes support the 
proposition that rising wages may lead to higher employment.” (Jerger/Michaelis, 2003, p. 437). Rather, he 
praised the unions for resisting nominal wage reductions, but nevertheless accepting reductions in real wages by  
way of a rising price level (Keynes, 1936, p.14). As we will see later, the theoretical analysis indeed suggests an 
asymmetric assessment of rising compared to declining wages in a Keynesian depression. The same is true for 
nominal wage cuts, as compared to declining wage rates due to rising prices, as the former use to happen in a 
depression, whereas the latter occur regularly within a prospering economy.       3 
Much of the literature on the PPA is in German.
2 This might have to do with the traditionally 
prominent role of unions in Germany and also with its specific historical experience of wage 
deflating policy in the Great Depression of the 1930s.
3 Most of these contributions are 
descriptive, or at best, provide rather heuristic theoretical or empirical arguments. Hence, 
unsurprisingly, particularly if one takes the language boundary into account, these 
contributions rarely entered the international debate. Most Anglo Saxon standard works on 
labour market theory, such as Layard et al. (1991), do not even mention the PPA, and there 
are few articles on the subject in international economic journals. As an exception, Pagano 
(1990) is occasionally cited, although he does not really deal with the purchasing power 
argument, but develops a spatial OLG-model exhibiting multiple equilibria, where a higher 
wage may be linked with higher employment. Dunlop (1938, pp 423) refers repeatedly to the 
PPA, quoting, for instance, an employer who argues according to the PPA as early as 1739. 
Yet, in Dunlop`s contribution, no deeper discussion of the argument can be found. 
 
Only recently, some more sophisticated theoretical articles on the subject have been 
published. Rohwedder/Herberg (1984) provide a model with a Kaldorian saving function and 
an IS-LM-framework on the demand side, while on the supply side, they use a production 
function which allows for either a decreasing or an increasing marginal productivity of labour. 
They do not find an unequivocal answer, but make several qualifications concerning the 
validity of the PPA. According to their results, a nominal wage increase is more likely to raise 
employment (i) the weaker the induced price increase, (ii) the more the workers` (and 
pensioners`) saving rates exceed the saving rate of capital holders, and (iii)  the larger the 
concomitant money supply increase (Rohwedder/Herberg 1984, pp 594). Their ultimate 
                                                 
2 Amongst many others, there are several contributions by the German Council of Economic Advisors, mostly 
rejecting the PPA. For a brief overview, see e.g. Rohwedder/Herberg (1984, p. 586).   
3 There was also a discussion on the PPA in the USA following the Great Depression, dealing with the 
consequences of the then National Recovery Administration and the Fair Labor Standards Act. For a brief 
overview, see, for example, Sargent (1939, pp 423).      4 
conclusion remains somewhat vague, stating that “anyone using the Purchasing Power 
Argument to propose a nominal wage increase during a recession ought to take into account 
the current attitude of the monetary authorities” (p. 597). 
 
Gros and Hefeker (1999) use a similar model, but assume equality of the real wage rate and 
the marginal productivity of labour.
4 According to their study, the validity of the PPA 
necessarily requires (i) a workers saving rate which exceeds that of the owners of capital, and 
(ii) a special - rather curious – relationship between the elasticity of labour demand and the 
price level (Gros/Hefeker, 1984, p. 22). They do not find an economically interpretable and 
sufficient condition for the PPA to apply. 
 
Jerger/Michaelis (2003) use a similar, but much more sophisticated model, applying a micro-
grounded Kaldorian saving function. On the supply side, they use a CES-function, allowing 
for different degrees of price stickiness and also for different degrees of capital stock 
flexibility. They conclude that the PPA is the more likely to apply (i) the less flexible the 
prices, (ii) the shorter the relevant period and therefore the less flexible the capital stock, and 
(iii) the more the workers saving rate exceeds the saving rate of the capital owners. However, 
they cannot generally rule out the possibility that the PPA may also be valid with both 
completely flexible prices and capital stock. Lastly, they refute the PPA-argument on the 
grounds of empirical implausibility of the specified conditions (Jerger/Michaelis 2003, p. 
454).   
 
Krüger (2004) also rejects the KKPT within the common Keynes-Kaldor framework, which 
he examined very precisely in his masters dissertation by using both static and dynamic 
analysis. However, he provides a rather original argument in favour of the PPA within an 
                                                 
4 We show below that, with this assumption, the PPA immediately collapses, irrespective of whatever 
assumptions on the demand side are made.   5 
OLG-context, where the older generation holds the bulk of the capital stock, but has a lower 
saving rate than the younger generation. Hence, if a wage hike were to benefit younger more 
than older workers, the average saving ratio would rise and thereby promote both growth and 
employment. However, apart from the very special assumptions necessary for this model to 
work, the argument is not really a specification of the PPA, because a supply-side effect and 
not a demand-side one drives output and employment. In the short term, total consumption is 
even reduced instead of being boosted, due to the rising rather than declining savings rate. 
 






1. A Simple Neoclassical Synthesis Model  
 
In the sequel we assume a neoclassical production function Y(N) with diminishing marginal 
product of labour and, hence, a downward sloping labour demand curve. Hence, if real wages 
W/P equal the marginal product of labour dY/dN, a rise in real wages definitely cannot result 
in increasing employment N, irrespective of any effect on total demand Y. With a given 
labour demand curve, the result could rather be a rise in both nominal income and the price 
level P.  
 
Yet the equality of real wages and marginal labour productivity is questioned by the 
proponents of the PPA. For in a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, total commodity 
demand is rationed by definition. Therefore, recruiting stops before its neoclassical   6 
equilibrium and hence dY/dN>W/P. Therefore, a rise in wages might, on the one hand, raise 
total demand and, on the other hand, do no - or minimal - harm on the supply side, finally 
resulting in rising employment.
5 
 
For a closer examination of this argument we employ a simple Keynesian model, where G 
denotes autonomous demand (including autonomous investment) and Q = WN/(YP) denotes 
the wage ratio. Following the literature cited above, we adopt a Kaldorian saving function, 
such that 
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where  w S and  p S denote the saving rates from labour income and capital income respectively.  
 
In contrast to conventional Keynesian models, we assume that autonomous investment is 
divided in two parts, namely investment Ib , providing for basic consumption, and investment 
Ih , providing for high quality consumption. On the assumption that, in a recession, luxury 
consumption is omitted first, Ih is relevant only if total demand exceeds a critical level Yc.  
From that accrues a path-dependency of the model, resulting in two different equilibrium 
levels of both G and Y: If total demand happens to fall short of Yc in any period, its 
equilibrium level drops to Yb with G = Gb. However, yet a one-time rise in any other 
component of total demand could, in principle, lead to an enduring return to the upper 
equilibrium Yh with G = Gh in this model. This “jump start”-approach appears to reflect the 
                                                 
5 Most of the theoretical literature assumes deviations from marginal cost pricing at the commodity side to create 
a situation where the PPA could work, see Jerger/Landmann (2003), Rohwedder/Herberg (1984). It appears 
more convenient and less arbitrary, however, simply to assume that P W N Y / / > d d , for whatever reason.   7 
arguments of both the proponents of the PPA and Keynes himself much better than a 
conventional static multiplier approach.    
 
2.1. The True Core of the PPA 
 
In any equilibrium, whether with full employment or not, pure profits must be zero, such that 
 
KR WN YP + =    ) 2 (   
 
with K denoting the capital stock and R being the interest rate on debt. In a Keynesian 
depression, KR is nearly constant in the short run, because neither interest payments on debt 
nor the capital stock can immediately be reduced according to the collapsing demand. Hence, 
we have for Y < Yh: 
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where the demand side effect of rising wages - given by the numerator - is c.p. positive, while 
the cost effect in the denominator is negative. The resulting sign of dN/dW in this model can 
be found by setting (1) equal to the production function Y(N) and solving for G : 
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By using (2i), we find  
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With  1 0 £ < £ p S Sw  both the numerator and the first summand in the denominator of (5) are 
positive. The same holds true for the second summand in the denominator with our 
assumptions  P W N Y / / > ¶ ¶  and R K WN YP + = , because then the second bracket in the 
denominator can be written as 
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Hence in the Kaldorian case  p S Sw < , with the real wage rate being below the marginal 
productivity of labour and pure profits being zero, dN/dW definitely has a positive sign, i.e. 
the PPA then apparently holds true!  
 
Note that (2i) is also satisfied, i.e. pure profits are still zero. For, because of the constant 
capital costs, the rise in total wage costs is exactly the same as the rise in total demand. 
Indeed, the real value of interest payment KR/P declines, because of the rising price level. 
However, that will not regularly affect entrepreneurs, unless interest is automatically linked to   9 
inflation. Moreover, with W/P < dY/dN, the real interest rate R/P must have exceeded K Y d d /  
anyway.
6 Therefore, its decline after the wage rise is nothing more than a normalization. 
 
It is often argued by the opponents to the PPA, that only part of the additional wage sum 
would result in higher commodity demand, another part being saved by the workers. 
However, this argument is clearly false. For, without the wage increase, an even greater 
amount of income would have been saved by the entrepreneurs, because of p S Sw < . Hence, 
total output actually rises, and so does total employment.  
 
2.2. Limits of the PPA  
The necessary assumptions for the PPA to work are that (i) non-consumption demand G and 
(ii) rental income KR are constant, that (iii) the saving rate from wage income is lower than 
that from interest income and (iv) that real wages are below marginal labour productivity. All 
of these conditions may certainly be fulfilled in a typical Keynesian depression, at least in the 
short run. Even then, however, there are definite limits of its power to reduce unemployment. 
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Partial derivation of (7) yields   
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< and vice versa.   10 








































which is clearly positive with our assumptions  P W N Y / / > d d and  w S S > p .
7 Hence (7) 
describes an upward sloped curve in figure 1, where the commodity market is in equilibrium 








                                            Figure i 
 
Starting from the lower equilibrium point B in figure (i), the unions could indeed foster 
employment by enforcing higher real wages, thereby moving upwards along the N(W/P) 
curve. Whether the full-employment-point H could be reached depends, however, on the 
nature of the slump: If it is only caused by a mere temporary disturbance, such that total 
output has happened to fall below its critical level Yc , increasing wages could indeed lead 
back from B via C to full-employment equilibrium H. In case of a more fundamental 
depression with decreasing autonomous demand Gb or Gh , however, rising wages definitely 
cannot regain full employment. They would rather lead to a medium point like M in figure (i), 
                                                 
7 From (7), it immediately follows that the numerator of (7i) is positive if  w S S > p . 
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where the real wage rate equals marginal labour productivity again, but is at the same time 
above of its full employment level H.   
 
The latter can be proved as follows: Assume that, due to any negative demand shock, former 
full employment output Yh has declined to Yb. Suppose that Gh = aGb with a > 0, and that the 
unions try to outweigh the demand gap by a higher nominal wage Wb = bWh with b > 0 , in 
order to realize Yh again. Then it follows from (1) that 
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From the zero-profit-condition (2i), it follows that  
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With our assumptions  P W N Y / / > d d and  w S S > p , equation (8) clearly has a positive sign. 
From that and (2ii), it follows that Yh could only be realized by a real wage which exceeds the 
former full employment wage rate as indicated by point H´ in the figure. That would mean, 
however, to replace Keynesian by neoclassical unemployment.  
   12 
2.3. Alternative Options to Fight a Keynesian Slump 
 
Is it really sensible to raise the wage rate in order to foster employment? Regarding the rather 
narrow conditions for this policy to work, it seems more appropriate to rely on traditional 
fiscal policy. In contrast to the PPA, the latter would even work in case of a permanent 
decrease of autonomous demand. Moreover, unlike, the PPA, traditional deficit spending does 
not imply the danger of inducing neoclassical instead of the original Keynesian 
unemployment. Hence, in case of doubt, it actually turns out to be the better advice.  
 
On the other hand,  according to (5), in a Keynesian depression, a further wage cut would 
reduce N even more. This occurs, because the induced fall in aggregate demand  YP D must 
exceed the induced cost reduction  ) ( R K WP + D  and hence, without dismissals, pure profits 
would inevitably become negative.
8 
Could decreasing prices be a substitute of rising nominal wages? After all, it is odd that, in 
our Keynesian depression model, all wages are below marginal labour productivity and yet no 
new workers are hired. Surely, the proponents of the PPA would answer that there is simply 
no need for more personnel, due to the slumped commodity demand. Yet, while this seems a 
valid argument in the aggregate model, it does not necessarily apply at the microeconomic 
level. Indeed, with the assumptions made above, the single firm does actually have both a 
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. Furthermore, it follows from (7), that  G YS > p  if  w S S > p  and vice 
versa. From this equation it is possible to derive that the term in squared brackets and hence also W d d / P is 
always positive if w S S > p , i.e. a wage reduction will also reduce pure profit P , q.e.d. It can equally be shown 
that generally,  0 / > W P d d must hold for w S S > p  .   13 
strong incentive and the ability to raise its production and also its employment. This is easy to 
see by deriving the individual profit function with respect to N, where P and W are now held 
constant, because of the only marginal effect the single producer has on both the price level 
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According to the positive sign of  N d d / P , the individual firm can easily sell all its output by 
reducing its prices marginally, even with constant total demand. Because this is true for all 
individual firms, they will all have an incentive to hire new staff and expand their output, until 
real wages equal marginal productivity of labour. They thereby create themselves the 
multiplier effects which are necessary to raise total demand and total wages. Therefore, a kind 
of a Keynesian invisible hand seems to appear in a Keynesian depression which raises 
employment and production anyway. 
 
Unfortunately, however, that does not help a lot. For in the new equilibrium, where 
N Y P W d d / / = must hold again, pure profits are negative. This follows immediately from 
deriving (2) with respect to P, yielding 
 




















In other words, while the price level seems to be constant for the single firm, in reality it 
decreases with rising output, thereby indeed increasing real wages and total demand, but also 
making pure profits decline.  Hence, we are left with a remarkable paradox: While, in a 
Keynesian depression, nominal wage increases could foster employment and real wage 
increases without inducing losses for the entrepreneurs, the same rise in real wages and   14 
employment, created by the market mechanism of falling prices, would result in permanent 
losses and, hence, in an unstable situation.
9     
 
 
2.4. A Numerical Example 
  
A numerical example might be helpful to understand the dynamics of the model. Suppose an 
economy with 75 . 0 25 . 0 = < = p S Sw , a capital stock  100 = K  and a production function 
NK Y = . Assume that  0.5 R    and    0.5  W 70,   Y  with  10   G    ; 50 c h = = = = = b G in the initial 
equilibrium point H.
10 Then Yh = Nh = 100, Ph = 1 and – according to (2i) - pure profits are 
zero.  
 
Now let Gb, due to any event, drop temporarily from 40 to 20 in the following periods, such 
that Yc is undercut  and, hence, Gh is now zero instead of 10. Accordingly, the economy 
shrinks to its lower equilibrium point B with Yb = 67.34 and Nb = 45.35.  
 
Here it is where the PPW can develop its full merits: A mere rise in nominal wages from 0.5 
to 0.6 would be sufficient to push up total demand above Yc within a few periods and, hence, 
make Gh recover to 10 again.
11 The new equilibrium is then equal to the original point H, 
apart from a 20% rise in both the nominal wage rate and the price level (see columns i and ii 
in the table below). 
 
 
                                                 
9 See also the numerical examples in the following section. 
10 Note that R is constant at 0.5 only if dY/dN < W/P, but could readily exceed that level if the entrepreneurs are 
no longer constrained by an insufficient commodity demand; see also the appendix.   







                                                             
                                                                       Figure (ii) 
Figure (ii) shows the dynamics of the model, with the full employment-levels of Y, P and 
(W/P) being normalized to 10 and pure profits being depicted at their absolute value. The 
wage rise indeed reduces profits at first, but it also increases total demand. Therefore, profits 
recover and become even positive in the following periods, because of rising prices and an 
improving degree of capital utilization. Finally, after some cyclical movements, both pure 
profits and the real wage rate are the same as in the initial equilibrium H, with full 
employment Nh being regained. 
 





























Gb  40.00  40.00  40.00  30.00  30.00  30.00 
Gh  10.00  0.00  10.00  0.00  0.00  00.00 
W  0.50  0.50  0.60  0.50  1.39  0.50 
Y  100.00  67.34  100.00  45.07  60.00  60.00 
N  100.00  45.35  100.00  20.32  36.00  36.00 
P  1.00  1.08  1.20  1.33  1.67  0.60 
Q  0.50  0.31  0.50  0.17  0.50  0.50 
P  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -32.00 
dY/dN  0.50  0.74  0.50  1.11  0.83  0.83 
W/P  0.50  0.46  0.50  0.37  0.83  0.83 
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As it has already been shown by equation (8), things are different in case of a permanent fall 
of autonomous demand G (see columns iv and v of the table). After a permanent fall in 
autonomous demand from 40 to 30, even a wage rise which makes labour costs equal to their 
marginal productivity does not lead back to full employment Yh. It rather results in a point 
like M in figure (i), where the real wage exceeds its full employment value and, hence, labour 
demand is then limited by the supply side rather than by total demand. 
 
The results of falling prices, as an alternative to rising nominal wages, are shown in column 
(vi) of the table. As was argued above, with a constant nominal wage, a fall in prices would 
lead to a similar medium equilibrium as point M in figure (i), but creates permanent losses. 
The same does apply to any combination of both lower nominal wages and lower prices. 
 
 
2.5. The PPA in an open economy  
 
The simple multiplier in (1) applies only in a closed economy, where the additional demand 
which is generated by rising wages benefits domestic suppliers only. In an open economy, 
however, the latter would only partly gain from the rising demand but have to face the full 
rise in costs. While this objection to the PPA is frequently raised verbally, it has never been 
proved formally.  
 
We introduce exports  ) (
- P X and imports  ) ; (
+ + P Y M into our model from section 2.2., still 
assuming that the real wage rate is lower than marginal labour productivity. Expanding the 
left-hand side of (3) by (X – M) and differentiating with respect to W yields: 
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where the Ei;j denote the elasticities of exports and imports with respect to P and Y. 
 
Other things being equal, the numerator in (5i) is clearly smaller than in the closed-economy 
case. Hence it seems, in perfect accordance with economic intuition, that dN/dW is the more 
reduced the greater total exports and total imports are, and the greater are the respective 
(absolute) elasticities EX;P and EM;P .   
 
However, the change in value of the denominator in (5i) is ambiguous. While it is raised by 
the first additional summand in comparison with (5), it is diminished by the second one,   18 
because of our assumption  N Y P W d d / / <  . Therefore, the PPA could principally even work 
in an open economy, although one has to make rather extreme assumptions for that to apply.  
 
The following example shows why this is the case. Assume that  initially  1 . 0 = = p S Sw , 
100 = K ,  NK Y =  ,  0.5 R   and     0.2    W ; 1 0 0 = = = G .  For simplicity, we assume that 
0 0 = M and  0 / / = = P M Y M d d d d . The export-function is assumed to be 
 
0         ) 11 (
      > =
- b
b p X X  
 
with  64 . 4 = X  and  80 . 1 = b . Then it can be calculated by numerical methods that X0 = 4.60, 
N0 = 31.36, Y0 = 56.00, P0 = 1.00 and  20 . 0 / 89 . 0 / = > = P W N Y d d (all values rounded to two 
decimal places). Equation (2i) is met, i.e. there are neither pure profits nor losses. From (5i) it 
then follows that 95 . 346 / = W N d d , i.e. the PPA appears to work. If, for example, the nominal 
wage rate rises to W1 = 0.21 in period t1, total employment, real income, and the real wage 




Note that there is no Kaldorian effect in this example because of our assumption  p S Sw = , and 
yet the PPA seems to work. This applies because in period t1 the price level P1 = 0.96 is lower 
than it is in period t0. This leads to a higher demand from abroad, which in turn allows for 
raising output and employment without reducing total profits. One has to ask, however, why 
                                                 
12 Generally, with  P = S SW and  0 ; ; = = Y M P M E E ,the denominator in (5i) is negative and, hence, 
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It is really hard, however, to find realistic numerical examples for this condition to apply.   19 
the entrepreneurs should wait with the price cuts until nominal wages are raised by the unions. 
Hence, the dynamics behind condition (5i) are more convincingly interpreted just the other 
way round: With a high share of exports in total demand, a national depression could 
eventually be overcome by cutting national prices and thereby making it possible that not only 
total output and employment, but also the real wage rate rises as a result of the rising exports. 





In recent times, the PPA has been subject to several theoretical analyses, which have provided 
an array of different - and sometimes  peculiar - conditions for the argument to hold. While it 
is unanimously regarded as necessary that the saving rate of workers must be lower than that 
of capital owners, the outcomes relating to sufficient conditions for the PPA have turned out 
to be either vague or barely interpretable in an economic sense. However, as was shown 
above, much of the cumbersome case differentiation in that literature could have been 
avoided. In particular, while the PPA is definitely invalid if the wage rate is equal to or even 
above marginal productivity of labour, it could work in principle if wages are below marginal 
productivity. However, simple deficit spending by the government appears to be a far better 
approach due to its lower or at least delayed cost effect. Indeed Keynes, to whom the 
proponents of the PPA frequently but erroneously refer, saw it this way. It has also been a 
result of our model, that neither a deflation policy is appropriate to cope with a Keynesian 
slump, nor does the market mechanism automatically lead back to full employment.     
 
The PPA becomes much less powerful in an open economy, because the demand effect of a 
wage increase then spreads among several countries, while the cost effect only impacts on   20 
one. While it cannot be ruled out generally, that the PPA might even work in an open 
economy, the conditions for that to apply turned out to be extreme and far away from reality. 
    
Apart from the qualifications which have already been made above – in particular the closed 
economy assumption – some more and quite fundamental objections can be raised against our 
analysis. In general, one has to be very cautious with pure macroeconomic analysis that is 
based largely on national account identities and aggregate functions for production and saving 
decisions. Moreover, our analysis has been mainly static. In particular, the assumption of an 
“autonomous” investment demand appears highly questionable, at least in  the long run. A 
more detailed dynamic analysis would at least have to take repercussions from pure profits on 
investment into account. Moreover, the role of expectation s of both consumers and 
entrepreneurs should be a central element of a more sophisticated model. A correspondingly 
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Appendix 
The dynamic model underlying figure (ii) in section 2.4. is based on the following lag-
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While (A1) is simply the production function, (A2) denotes total real demand, where 
autonomous demand G is defined in real terms and real consumption depends on nominal 
incomes of the proceeding period and the current price level.  According to (A3), labour 
demand is either derived from marginal productivity (see the lower term) or from the 
restricted commodity demand (see the upper term). (A4) implies that R tends to normalize 
pure profits to zero unless it undercuts its lower limit.    
If dY/dN = W/P, the equilibrium price level for Yd = Ys can be calculated from (A1), (A2) 
and the lower term in (A3) as 
W K
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If dY/dN > W/P, it is assumed that the entrepreneurs seek to realize zero profits, i.e. they set 
the prices such as to satisfy  
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